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The Changing Face of Taxation of Virginia Business
After American Woodmark and DataComp
by
D. French Slaughter IlI
McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, L.L.P.
I. Being a Manufacturer - Why It's Important.
A. Tangible Personal Property Tax -
1. Favorable Rate for Manufacturer's "Machinery and Tools." See Va. Code §
58.1-3507.
2. No Tax On Manufacturer's Other Personal Property (e.g., @Corporate
Headquarters). Va. Code § 58.1-1101 provides that:
Classification, rate of tax. -- A. The subjects of taxation classified
by this section are hereby defined as intangible personal property:
2. Capital which is personal property, tangible in fact, used in
manufacturing,.., businesses. Machinery and tools, motor vehicles and
delivery equipment of such businesses shall not be defined as intangible
personal property for purposes of this chapter and shall be taxed locally as
tangible personal property according to the applicable provisions of law
relative to such property;
C. The subjects of intangible personal property set forth in
subdivision 1 through 8 of subsection A shall be exempt from [local]
taxation as provided in Article X, Section 6(a)(5) of the Constitution of
Virginia.
3. Other Protected Business in Addition to Manufacturing (e.g., mining,
broadcasters, dairies, laundries) § 58.1-1100.
B. BPOL License Tax - Exclusion for Manufacturer's Sales Made "At Wholesale at
the Place of Manufacture"
§ 58.1-3703. Counties, cities and towns may impose local
license taxes; limitations of authority. -- A. The governing body of any
[locality] may levy... [local] license taxes on businesses, trades,
professions, occupations, and callings and upon the persons, firms, and
corporations engaged therein within the [locality] subject to the limitations
provided [below].
B. No county, city, or town shall levy any license tax:
4. On a manufacturer for the privilege of manufacturing and
selling goods, wares, and merchandise at wholesale at the place of
manufacture;
C. Sales and Use Tax - "Property Directly Used In Manufacturing [or Processing]"
Not Subject To Sales and Use Tax. See Va. Code § 58.1-602, 609.3.
D. Tax Credits
1. Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit § 58.1-439. Available to facilities in
qualifying industries including "manufacturing."
E. Manufacturer Status Not Particularly Helpful For
1. Income Taxes (except to extent it skews property, payroll factors).
2. Real Estate Taxes.
F. "Manufacturing" Tests for Property Tax and BPOL Tax Overlap. See infra.
1. Sales Tax Precedent Less Helpful. Because the sales tax exemption extends
to "processors" as well as "manufacturers," sales tax precedent does not
carry over to property tax and BPOL as well. See Orange-Madison Coop.
infra.
II. The Old Days: Virginia's Painful Search for a Tax Definition of Manufacturing in Virginia
A. "Manufacturing" Defined
1. Substantial Transformation - Solite Corp. v. County of King George, 220
Va. 661, 261 S.E.2d 535 (1980).
Facts: "Big rocks into little rocks." Taxpayer operates a facility
where it extracts broken rocks, clay, and sand from the
earth and produces sand and gravel. The finished products
are sold to suppliers or builders.
Issue: Whether Taxpayer's extracting and processing of sand and
gravel constitute manufacturing for BPOL purposes.
Holding: No. Unless processing transforms material into a product of
substantially different character, it cannot be considered
"manufacturing" even though the value or usefulness of the
product is increased. There must be transformation; a new
and different article must emerge, having a distinctive name,
character or use.
2. Processing v. Manufacturing - Commonwealth v. Orange-Madison Coop.
Farm Serv., 220 Va. 655, 261 S.E.2d 532 (1980).
Facts: Taxpayer operates feed and fertilizer plants. At the feed
plants, grain is passed through a steam cooker where
moisture is added and the grain is cracked. The grain is then
flattened by passing through two rollers and is subsequently
dried. The process then requires the addition of several
different ingredients. All of these elements are then blended
to achieve a final product. At the fertilizer plants, chemicals
are blended by machinery into a finished fertilizer product
meeting the individual farmer's needs as determined by
scientific testing of soil conditions. Taxpayer argued for
sales tax exemption on its equipment purchases.
Issue: Whether processing, like manufacturing, entails a
transformation of a raw material into an article or product
of substantially different character.
Holding: No. "Processing" and "manufacturing" are not synonymous.
Here, taxpayer was a processor but not a manufacturer.
Processor is an easier standard and still gets the sales tax
exemption. "Processing," unlike "manufacturing," does not
require transformation of a raw material into a different
article but merely requires that the product undergo a
treatment rendering the product more marketable or useful.
Production of feed and fertilizer satisfies all requisites of
"processing." See also Golden Skillet Corp. v.
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 276, 199 S.E.2d 511 (1973)
(restaurant fryers are not "processing" equipment).
B. WINNERS: Business Activities Deemed to be Manufacturing
1. Transforming livestock into different meat products. Morris & Co. v.
Commonwealth, 116 Va. 912 (1914).
2. The production of condensed milk, milk powder and cheese. Richmond v,
Dairy Compan, 156 Va. 63 (1931).
3. Curing of hams, bacon, and making sausage. Commonwealth v. Meyer,
180 Va. 466 (1942).
4. Drying, crushing, grading, and packing of herbs. 1984-85 Atty. Gen. Ann.
Rep. 398.
5. Crushing and compacting of scrap metal. 1984 Atty. Gen. Ann. Rep. 398.
But see Money Point Land Holding Corp. v. City of Chesapeake,
(Chesapeake Cir. Ct. 1995).
6. Mixing and piping two chemicals at a controlled temperature and speed
into a ship's void spaces where the solution expanded tenfold and became
rigid. City of Newport News v. Ryan Marine Corp., 6 Va. Cir. 178 (1984).
7. Ship building and ship repair. Opinion of Tax Commissioner, December 28,
1984.
8. Hardware engineering. 1991 Atty. Gen. Ann. Rep. 248.
9. Thawing frozen shrimp, treating the shrimp with chemicals, deveining,
deshelling, and refreezing. 1993 Op, Va. Atty. Gen. 231.
10. Tee shirt silk screening. 1996 Op. Va. Atty. Gen.
C. LOSERS: Business Activities Deemed Not to be Manufacturing.
1. Pasteurization of milk and producing buttermilk. Richmond v. Dairy
Company, 156 Va. 63 (1931).
2. Killing and defeathering chickens and preparing for fryers. Prentice v. City
of Richmond, 197 Va. 724 (1956)
3. Blending of rock and gravel. Solite v. King George Co., 220 Va. 661
(1980).
4. Mixing sand, rock, and cement. 1984-85 Atty. Gen, Ann, Rep. 356.
5. Grading and packing of herbs. 1984-85 Atty. Gen. Ann. Rep. 398.
6. Selling of scrap metal or junk items. 1984-85 Atty. Gen. Ann. Rep. 398.
7. Wholesaling of raw nitrate. 1986-87 Atty. Gen. Ann. Rep. 288.
8. Production of steam from boiling water. November 2, 1987. Opinion by
State Tax Commissioner W.H. Forst.
9. Combining steel and friction material into disk pads and brake shoes.
Henrico v. Grunnell Brake, 10 Va. Cir. 377 (1988).
10. Development of computer software. 1991 Atty. Gen. Ann, Rep. 248.
11. Shoe repair. Nov. 22, 1994. Opinion by State Tax Commissioner (P.D.
94-349).
HI. The Modern Era: Manufacturing As An Elastic Concept
A. Question Becomes Not What Is Manufacturing (Solite Test) But Who Is
Manufacturer...
1. The Benchmark. In County of Chesterfield vs. BBC Brown Boveri. Inc.,
238 Va. 64, 380 S.E.2d 890 (1989), the Virginia Supreme Court was asked
to determine whether a taxpayer engaged in both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing activities could be classified as a "manufacturer" for
purposes of both property tax - for the machinery and tools rate - and
BPOL.
2. The Facts. In 1974, Brown Boveri opened a facility in Chesterfield County
to repair used turbine generators previously manufactured in Europe by
BB's Swiss parent company and in use by electric power companies in the
United States. Over time, the windings, blades, and rotors on the turbine
generators deteriorate impairing efficient operation of turbine generator
unit. Brown Boveri's work at the Chesterfield site included replacement of
the copper windings, replacement of damaged turbine blades, and repair of
cracked, imbalanced, or bent rotor shafts.
(a) Taxpayer Did Lots of Things. Brown Boveri also performed repairs on
industrial equipment other than turbine generators, provided professional
engineering services to customers, and obtained some revenues from
rentals of equipment and retail sales of items not manufactured by Brown
Boveri. In addition, Brown Boveri performed a limited amount of
manufacturing by completing the final steps in the production of turbine
generators manufactured by Brown Boveri in Europe.
(b) The Audit. The County reviewed all of Brown Boveri's invoice and job
file records pertaining to work billed by Brown Boveri from 1980 through
1983. Arguably, the manufacturing portion of Brown Boveri's business
ranged from 5% to 30% over four years.
The County concluded that, while Brown Boveri performed some limited
manufacturing work, Brown Boveri's business essentially involved the
servicing and repairing of used, broken, or damaged turbine generators and
other industrial equipment. In one County official's words, it was "just a
glorified auto repair shop." Since service and repair constituted the
predominant percentage of its work activity, the Commissioner concluded
that Brown Boveri was not a manufacturing business. Non-manufacturing
activity was separated into personal service, professional service, retail
sales, rental, and other activities so that business license tax rates could be
applied to each of Brown Boveri's non-manufacturing revenue areas.
3. The Substantiality Test To The Rescue. The Virginia Supreme Court held
that even though Brown Boveri was engaged in both manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing activities, it would be classified as a "manufacturer" for
tax purposes if the manufacturing portion of its business was substantial in
comparison to its total activities. The court held that in order to be
considered "substantial" the manufacturing component of a business must
not be "de minimis, merely trivial, or only incidental to its principal
business." Brown Boveri, 238 Va. at 71, 380 S.E.2d at 893-894.
(a) Factors. The court listed a number of factors to be considered in
determining whether the manufacturing component of a multi-purpose
business is substantial. These factors include: the manufacturing
component's financial receipts, its proportion of the total corporate income,
the percentage it comprises of the total capital investment in the business,
the number of employees working in the manufacturing component as
compared to the total number of employees of the business, and the ratio of
manufacturing activities to the entire business. Applying these factors, the
Supreme Court found that Brown Boveri's manufacturing activities were
substantial when compared to its total activities.
4. The "Ancillary and Integral" Test Too.
In Brown Boveri, the County of Chesterfield had also argued that the
design and engineering stages of the taxpayer's manufacturing projects did
not constitute "manufacturing" for purposes of Virginia law. The Virginia
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that activities that are ancillary or
integral to manufacturing activities are properly classified as
"manufacturing." Brown Boveri's design and engineering work, being
ancillary and integral to the manufacturing process, therefore constituted
"manufacturing" for purposes of Virginia Code § 58.1-3507.
5. Conclusions:
a. Pro-Manufacturer. Public policy of Virginia is to encourage
manufacturing; therefore, the definition of manufacturing should be
liberally applied for the benefit of businesses.
b. No Change in the Definition. Solite's "transformation-of-raw-
materials" definition of manufacturing was not changed by Brown
Boveri but it was stretched to cover what many call "re-
manufacturing." which Virginia business does a lot.
c. "Ancillary & Integral". A multi-purpose business will be
categorized as a single business when the multiple activities are
related. See 1997 BPOL Guidelines.
d. "Substantial" Is All It Takes. To determine the nature of a business
decide what business it is "substantially" engaged in.
"Substantiality" for manufacturing purposes is:
(1) Not susceptible to mathematical precision;
(2) Not "de minimis, trivial or incidental" to its principal
businesses;
(3) Not synonymous with "preponderance" (51%). In fact,
localities still argue ruefully that Brown Boveri holds that
only 5% manufacturing constitutes "substantial" for
classification purposes. See Remarks of Jeffrey Mincks,
Assistant County Attorney, VAAO Conference, Oct. 14,
1993.
B. Recent Tax Developments Since Brown Boveri
1. No Virginia Supreme Court decisions since 1989 have modified Brown
Boven.
2. Virginia Circuit Court Trial Decisions:
a. "Ancillary and Integral" Goes For a Road Test. In LG&E
Westmoreland Hopewell, et al. v. City of Hopewell, Circuit Court of the
City of Hopewell, Law Nos. CL93-117, CL93-118 and CL93-119 (1994).
The taxpayer produced electrical power for cogeneration to supply
electricity directly to industries and to Virginia Power. Virginia Power paid
LG&E for the electricity that it purchased and, in addition, paid for the
capital costs to provide excess generation capacity whether Virginia Power
actually purchased the power or not. The excess capacity was guaranteed
for Virginia Power during peak periods. The City first argued that the
provision of electric power for purchase by Virginia Power did not
constitute manufacturing under § 58.1-3703(b)(4). The City instead argued
that supplying power was a service. Secondarily, the City argued that even
if the provision of electricity to Virginia Power was manufacturing, that its
gross receipts from Virginia Power for providing capacity was certainly not
manufacturing. The Court disagreed on both counts and indicated that
creation of electricity was manufacturing and that under the Brown Boveri
decision, such payments for capacity were an activity that was integral and
ancillary to LG&E's manufacture of electricity. On March 2, 1995, the
Virginia Supreme Court denied LG&E's petition for appeal, finding that
there was no reversible error in the trial court's decision.
b. Computers Get Into the Act. Fairfax County v. DataComp Cor.
Va. Cir. 60 (1995), Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Law #
128829. relied on Brown Boveri, Discussed Below.
C. Solite Told Us "What." Brown Boveri Told Us "Who." But American Woodmark
Said Where Was Irrelevant Because Manufacturing Anywhere is Manufacturing
Everywhere.
The Second Benchmark. The Virginia Supreme Court's 1995 decision in City o
Winchester v. American Woodmark Corporation, 250 Va. 451, 464 S.E.2d 148
(1995) ("American Woodmark") represents a landmark case in the construction of
"manufacturing" for Virginia tax purposes. American Woodmark Corporation, the
nation's third largest manufacturer of kitchen cabinets, has its corporate
headquarters in Winchester, Virginia, but no manufacturing plant there. The City
of Winchester assessed tangible personal property tax against American
Woodmark's office furniture, fixtures, equipment, and computers used at its
Winchester headquarters arguing that American Woodmark was not a
"manufacturer" and, even if it was, it was at least not engaged in a "manufacturing
business" in Winchester. American Woodmark has three important holdings.
1. Protecting the Manufacturer's Non-Manufacturing Assets - "There's No
Where There." The City of Winchester had attempted to limit the
definition of a "manufacturer" to a business that carries on actual
manufacturing operations within the taxing locality. The City
unsuccessfully argued that American Woodmark, despite its extensive
manufacturing operations throughout the country, would not be classified
as a "manufacturer" because it conducted no manufacturing within the City.
The Court rejected this interpretation, holding that American Woodmark's
personal property at its headquarters still constituted "capital used in a
manufacturing business" and thus was not subject to taxation by the City.
The Court's holding in American Woodmark means that a manufacturer
anywhere is a manufacturer everywhere, and the components of that
business are taxable, or not taxable, under the rules applicable to
manufacturers generally no matter where those components, including the
manufacturing plant, are located.
2. A Precedent Definition For "Machinery and Tools." The second important
aspect of the American Woodmark decision is that the Court, for the first
time, defined the term "machinery and tools" for Virginia tax purposes.
Under Va. Code § 58.1-1101 (A)(2) "machinery and tools" -- even if used
in a manufacturing business -- are not treated as "intangible personal
property" and are, therefore, subject to local tax.
(1) Is a Machine Like a Computer "Machinery"? The City of
Winchester argued that any machine with moving parts,
e.g., a computer, was necessarily classified as "machinery
and tools" and thus American Woodmark's headquarters
office equipment and computers were subject to taxation by
the City as "machinery and tools."
(2) Nope. The Court disagreed, citing with approval the
definition used for decades by the Virginia State Tax
Commissioner and the Attorney General:
machinery and tools used in a particular
manufacturing business' are the machinery
and tools which are necessary in the
particular manufacturing business and which
are used in connection with the operation of
machinery which is actually and directly used
in the manufacturing process ....
(3) The Shop Floor Test. Applying this test, the Court held that
American Woodmark's furniture, fixtures, office equipment,
and computer equipment were not "machinery and tools"
within the meaning of Code § 58.1-1101 (A)(2) because
these items are not used in connection with the operation of
machinery which is actually and directly used in the
manufacturing process. 250 Va. at 152, 464 S.E.2d at 458
(citations omitted). The "directly used" concept is defined,
for sales tax purposes, in Va. Code § 58.1-602 (equipment
used in administration not "directly used" in manufacturing).
3. The Locality. Not the Taxpayer. Bears The Burden of Refuting This
"Exclusion,"
The third important aspect of the American Woodmark I decision is that
the Supreme Court of Virginia specifically held that Virginia Court § §
58.1-1100 and 58.1-1101 must be construed in favor of taxpayers, with the
burden on the localities to prove their right to tax property. Virginia Code
§ 58.1-1101, according to the Court, did not exempt manufacturers from
taxation, but classified and segregated certain types of property for taxation
only by the Commonwealth. In segregating this property for state taxation,
the General Assembly was specifically withholding from the localities the
power to tax manufacturers' intangible personal property. As such, these
statutes were not tax "exemptions," which the law requires to be narrowly
construed against the taxpayer, but general tax statutes, which according to
the Court,
... are to be construed most strongly against the government, and
in favor of the citizen, and are not to be extended by implication
beyond the clear import of the language used. Whenever there is
just doubt, "that doubt should absolve the taxpayer from his
burden." 250 Va. at 152, 464 S.E.2d at 456.
See also Brown Boveri, supra, re: liberal construction of the definition of
"manufacturing."
D. Fallout from American Woodmark.
a. Nontraditional Uses. Is a Soft Drink Vending Machine Excluded
from Property Tax?
b. What About Leased Equipment? Note that Va. Code §
58.1-1101 (A)(2) relates to property "used in a manufacturing
business, not property "owned by" a manufacturing business. In
City of Martinsville v. Tultex Corporation, 238 Va. 59, 381 S.E.2d
6 (1989), the Virginia Supreme Court made clear that personal
property leased to and used in a manufacturing business would be
classified as intangible personal property segregated for state
taxation only under § 58.1-1101 (A)(2) notwithstanding the fact that
the property was actually owned by a non-manufacturer. Thus,
leased equipment used by a manufacturing business should not be
subject to local personal property tax, regardless of the status of the
actual title-holder to the property.
c. Parent-Subsidiary Structures. Is the holding company engaged in
the "manufacturing business" of its subsidiaries are engaged in the
manufacturing and sale of products? The statute's reference to
"business" and not "taxpayer" suggests that the taxpayer's line of
business, not its corporate structure, is the controlling factor.
IV. The Computer Age - Hardware Assembly is Manufacturing Too.
A. Fairfax County v. DataComp Corporation. 36 Va. Cir. 60 (Fairfax Co. Cir. Ct.
2.99). In this 1995 trial court case, the Fairfax County Circuit Court adopted a
broad construction of "manufacturing," finding that the production of computers
constituted "manufacturing" and therefore was not subject to BPOL taxation by
Fairfax County.
B. The Facts. DataComp Corporation was in the business of producing and selling
personal computers, file servers, and computer parts. In producing its computers,
DataComp acquired various component parts such as motherboards, power
switches, cabling, and brackets from other manufacturers, which it tested to ensure
quality and compatibility with FCC standards. DataComp technicians then
assembled and integrated.these parts into a final product through a process
involving soldering, taping, and connecting of the materials by trained employees.
C. The Issue. DataComp argued that it was entitled to the BPOL exclusion under Va.
Code § 58.1-3703(B)(4), which forbids counties from levying a license tax "on a
manufacturer for the privilege of manufacturing and selling goods, wares, and
merchandise at wholesale at the place of manufacture." Va. Code § 58.1-
3703(B)(4). Fairfax County took the position that "mere" assembly of component
parts is not manufacturing.
D. The Holding. Under the three prong Solite test for determining whether a business
activity constituted manufacturing, the Court looked to: (1) the original material,
sometimes referred to as "raw" material, (2) the process in which the raw material
is changed, and (3) the resulting product, and the sense in which it differs from the
raw material. Citing Brown Boveri, the Circuit Court said that whether the activity
constitutes manufacturing should be liberally construed to encourage
manufacturing in the Commonwealth. Moreover, the Court indicated that the use
of raw materials did not require use of "natural" raw materials because such a
limited test would be inappropriate in this age of advanced technology. Instead,
citing Brown Boveri again, the Court focused on whether there had been a
transformation of "new" material into an article or product with substantially
different character.
E. The Computers and Cars Analogy. The evidence according to the Court convinced
them that DataComp's production of computers involved the transformation and
integration of components into a final product of substantially different character,
not unlike the activity engaged in by General Motors. Finally, the Court decided
that since the president testified that well over half of its business activities
consisted of producing computers and monitors for government contracts, that
easily met the substantiality test for manufacturing set forth in Brown Boveri.
F. Practical Results of DataComp. The Fairfax County Circuit Court's holding in
DataComp Corp., combined with American Woodmark, suggests that the
definition of "manufacturing" for BPOL tax purposes is broad enough to
encompass a range of high tech and light industrial processes not previously
included in most localities' traditionally narrow "smokestack" interpretation of
"manufacturing." DataComp makes clear that computer producers' personal
property (other than assembly-line machinery and tools) should not be subject to
local personal property tax.
G. Be Careful.
1. Trial Decision Only. DataComp is only a Virginia trial court decision, not
binding outside of Fairfax.
2. Is Soldering Critical? Even the DataComp facts and holding are pre-
historic in today's world where hand soldering of computers parts is all but
extinct.
3. Practical Tip: "Let's Go to the Videotape." At least one county has
accepted a hardware manufacturer's video of non-Virginia manufacturing
activities as evidence.
H. Department of Taxation's New BPOL Guidelines Discuss Manufacturing vs.
Assembly. As the above cases demonstrate, one nagging problem in defining
"manufacturing" for Virginia tax purposes has -been the distinction between
"assembly" and "manufacturing." When is "assembly" manufacturing, and when is
it not? In January 1997, the Virginia Department of Taxation issued BPOL
Guidelines that addressed, among other things, this distinction. According to the
Department, the facts and circumstances of the business must be evaluated to
determine whether the assembly of purchased components is a separate service or
part of the manufacturing process. Factors which suggest that assembly is part of
the manufacturing process include, but are not limited to, any one or more of the
following:]
(i) The assembly process is complex and uses numerous parts;
(ii) Following assembly, the component parts cannot be recognized without
previous knowledge;
(iii) The component parts cannot readily be used for any purpose other than
incorporation into the finished product. See, Virginia Department of
Taxation, Guidelines for Business. Professional, and Occupational License
Tax Imposed by City. County, and Town Ordinances, Appendix B, 2-3
(Jan. 1, 1997).
Remember Even Non-Manufacturers With Lots of Computers Need to Pay
Attention.
1. Telecommunications Industries. Inc. v. Fairfax County Board of
Supervisors, 246 Va. 472, 436 S.E.2d 442 (1993).
a. Issue. This November 1993 ruling of the Supreme Court of
Virginia and follow-up action by the Virginia General Assembly in
1994 codifying the result creates the potential for many taxpayers
owning computers and other rapidly depreciating assets to obtain
refunds of local personal property taxes paid with respect to those
assets.
b. Facts. In Telecommunications Industries, Inc., the Supreme Court
has ruled that the value of personal property upon which the
personal property tax can be assessed cannot exceed the property's
fair market value including reductions in fair market value
attributable to obsolescence and other market factors. For
example, if your firm purchased a mainframe computer during 1990
for $1 million and the value of the computer, due to the
introduction of a new advanced line of computers, was reduced to
$250,000 by 1991, then the fair market value upon which the 1991
personal property tax could be assessed is $250,00. Contrary to
this fair market value limitation, most Virginia localities have been
valuing business equipment, including computers, for property
taxation at a fixed percent of original cost so that the value of the
computer during 1991 would be specified as a standard percentage
of the $1 million original cost without regard to obsolescence and
the real value of the equipment. For example, in Fairfax County,
the second year percentage was fifty-five percent so that the
country's determination of the 1991 value would have been
$550,000, i.e., $300,000 in excess of the true fair market value.
c. Holding. The Virginia Supreme Court ordered Fairfax County to
refund all personal property taxes attributable to the $300,000
overassessment. The Court held that the limitations against
assessments in excess of fair market value overrode uniformity
considerations.
2. Practical Effect. The Telecommunications Industries. Inc. case released a
flood of refund cases by large computer-owning taxpayers who were not
otherwise manufacturers, e.g., Northern Virginia government contractors.
After several years of litigation, a trial court decision and the County's
appeal to the Supreme Court was denied, the Mitre litigation was recently
concluded in late 1996 with a refund to the taxpayers on most but not all of
the claims asserted. Similar claims are pending in other jurisdictions. Many
localities now classify computers separately from other business property
for separate and more liberal assessment schedules that reflect the
technological obsolescence of computers.
V. Conclusion.
A. The Scope of the Test for Manufacturing and the Tax Exclusion Continues to
Grow.
1. The Test of Manufacturing: As the transition from Solite to DataComp.
illustrates, the traditional "smokestack" test of manufacturers is now
obsolete.
2. The Scope of the Exclusion: Brown Boveri and now American Woodmark
further illustrate the broad, liberalized scope of the manufacturer exclusion
and that the tax benefits to manufacturers extend far beyond the factory
gate.
B. Localities are Grappling With These Trends
1. Lobbying for change - The 1997 Colgan Bill To Abolish Property Tax.
2. Looking for Their Own Loopholes - Testing Manufacturing Claims
a. Local Tax Officials Still Smoldering Over Brown Boveri, American
Woodmark, BPOL reform. DataComp opens up an entire new
industry to the exclusion.
b. To test whether the taxpayer qualifies as a manufacturer, localities
look at:
(1) Homepage on the Internet
(2) Prospectus, financing applications
(3) Annual report, corporate income transactions, SIC code
(4) State income tax filings
(5) Business licenses
(6) Leases
(7) Advertisements
(8) Nature of change in raw materials
(9) Is the property really used in the manufacturing business
(e.g., the CEO's fishtank).
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